

## JPCERT/CC Incident Handling Report

## April 1, 2020 ~ June 30 , 2020



JPCERT Coordination Center July 14, 2020

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## 1. About the Incident Handling Report

JPCERT Coordination Center (herein, JPCERT/CC) receives reports on computer security incidents (herein, incidents) that occur inside and outside Japan<sup>[\*1]</sup>. This report will introduce statistics and case examples for incident reports received during the period from April 1, 2020 through June 30, 2020

[\*1] JPCERT/CC refers to all events that may occur in the management of information systems, which include events that may be considered security issues and any case related to computer security, as an incident.

JPCERT/CC's activities are aimed at recognition and handling of incidents for Internet users and to prevent the spreading of damages from incidents. For incidents that require global coordination and assistance, JPCERT/CC acts as the point of contact for Japan and performs coordination with relevant parties domestically and globally (overseas CSIRTs, etc.).

## 2. Quarterly Statistics

[Chart 1] shows the total number of incident reports, reported incidents and incidents that JPCERT/CC coordinated during this quarter.

	Apr	May	lun	Total	Last Qtr.
	Арі	way	Juli	TOtal	Total
Number of Reports *2	3,105	3,256	4,055	10,416	6,361
Number of Incident *3	2,221	2,277	2,625	7,123	5,509
Cases Coordinated *4	1,480	1,173	1,548	4,201	4,107

[Chart 1: Number of incident reports]

- [\*2] "Number of Reports" refers to the total number of reports sent through the web form, e-mail or FAX.
- [\*3] "Number of Incidents" refers to the number of incidents contained in each report. Multiple reports on the same incident are counted as 1 incident.
- [\*4] "Number of Cases Coordinated" refers to the number of cases where coordination took place to prevent the spreading of an incident by sending them a report and asking the site administrator to address any issues.

The total number of reports received in this quarter was 10,416. Of these, the number of domestic and overseas sites that JPCERT/CC coordinated with was 4,201. When compared with the previous quarter, the total number of reports increased by 60%, and the number of cases coordinated increased by 2%.

Year on year, the number of reports increased by 172%, and the number of cases coordinated increased by 50%.

[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the monthly changes in the total number of reports and incident cases coordinated by JPCERT/CC.



[Figure 1: Change in the number of incident reports]





[Figure 2: Change in the number of incident cases coordinated]

At JPCERT/CC, incident reports that were received are categorized, coordinated and handled according to the incident category that they fall into. For definitions on each incident category, please see "Appendix 1 - Incident Categories." [Chart 2] shows the number of incidents received per category in this quarter. The percentage that each category represents over the total number of incidents in this quarter is shown in [Figure 3].

Incident Category	Apr	May	Jun	Total	Last Qtr. Total
Phishing Site	1,599	1,704	1,959	5,262	3,839
Website Defacement	50	95	146	291	192
Malware Site	53	43	37	133	250
Scan	348	286	348	982	713
DoS/DDoS	54	0	16	70	21
ICS Related	0	0	0	0	0
Targeted attack	2	2	2	6	2
Other	115	147	117	379	492

[Chart 2 : Number of incidents by category]





[Figure 3: Percentage of incidents by category]

Incidents categorized as phishing sites accounted for 73.9%, and those categorized as scans, which search for vulnerabilities in systems, made up 13.8%.

[Figure 4] through [Figure 7] show the monthly changes in the number of incidents categorized as phishing sites, website defacement, malware sites and scans over the past year.



[Figure 4: Change in the number of phishing sites]





[Figure 5: Change in the number of website defacements]









[Figure 7: Change in the number of scans]

[Figure 8] provides an overview as well as a breakdown of the incidents that were coordinated / handled.



No.Incidents 7123	No.Reports 10416	Coordinated 4201		
Phishing Site 5262	Incidents Notified 21 02 – Site Operation Verified	Domestic 50%	Time (business days)0~3days77%4~7days13%8~10days5%11 days(more than)5%	Notification Unnecessary 3160 - Site could not be verified
Web defacement 291	Incidents Notified 218 – Verified defacement of site – High level threat	Domestic 89%	Time (business days)0~3days34%4~7days27%8~10days6%11days(more than)34%	Notification Unnecessary 73 – Could not verify site – Party has been notified – Information sharing – Low level theat
Malware Site 133	Incidents Notified 67 - Site operation verified - High level threat	Domestic 30% Overseas 70%	Time (business days)0~3days50%4~7days22%8~10days9%11days(more than)20%	Notification Unnecessary 66 - Could not verify site - Party has been notified - Information sharing - Low level theat
Scan 982	Incidents Notified 290 – Detailed logs – Notification desired	Domestic 85%		Notification Unnecessary 692 – Incomplete logs – Party has been notified – Information Sharing
DoS/DDoS 70	Incidents Notified 61 – Detailed logs – Notification desired	Domestic 100% Overseas -		Notification Unnecessary 9 - Incomplete logs - Party has been notified - Information Sharing
ICS Related	Incidents Notified O	Domestic _ Overseas _		Notification Unnecessary O
Targeted attack 6	Incidents Notified 1 – Verified evidence of attack – Verified infrastructure for attack	Domestic 100% Overseas –		Notification Unnecessary 5 – Insufficient information – Currently no threat
Other 379	Incidents Notified 124 -High level threat -Notification desired	Domestic 56% Overseas 44%		Notification Unnecessary 255 – Party hasnbeen notified – Information Sharing – Low level threat

[Figure 8: Breakdown of incidents coordinated/handled]



## 3. Incident Trends

### 3.1. Phishing Site Trends

During this quarter, 5,262 reports on phishing sites were received, representing a 37% increase from 3,839 in the previous quarter. This marks a 170% increase from the same quarter last year (1,947).

During this quarter, there were 1,489 phishing sites that spoofed domestic brands, increasing 67% from 894 in the previous quarter. There were 3,265 phishing sites that spoofed overseas brands, increasing 32% from 2,474 in the previous quarter. The breakdown of the brand type (domestic, overseas) that the phishing sites spoofed in this quarter is shown in [Chart 3], and a breakdown by industry for domestic and overseas brands is shown in [Figure 9].

			Jun	Domestic/
Phishing Site	Apr	May		Overseas
				Total (%)
Domestic Brand	542	396	551	1,489(28%)
Overseas Brand	892	1,153	1,220	3,265(62%)
Unknown Brand 🛤	165	155	188	508(10%)
Monthly Total	1,599	1,704	1,959	5,262

[Chart 3: Number of reported phishing sites by domestic/overseas brand]

[\*5] "Unknown Brand" refers to sites which could not be verified since the reported site had already been suspended when accessed for confirmation.



[Figure 9 : Percentage of reported phishing sites by industry (domestic/overseas)]



Out of the total number of phishing sites reported to JPCERT/CC, 77.7% spoofed e-commerce websites for overseas brands and 43.6% spoofed corporate websites for domestic brands, both representing the largest share respectively.

As in the previous quarter, there were many phishing sites spoofing e-commerce websites overseas, and many phishing sites spoofing corporate websites in Japan.

The URL of some of the phishing sites reported contained the word "COVID-19," which is not in any way related to the brand, apparently in an attempt to draw the attention of the visitor.

E-mail is the primary method used to lure visitors to phishing sites spoofing e-commerce websites. Many such e-mails contained fraudulent messages that make it appear as if the login account has been misused, such as "Unauthorized login was detected. Please confirm" and "Your account has been locked. See the link for instructions on how to unlock your account," along with a link to the phishing site.

Many of the phishing sites spoofing overseas brands used .com, .top and .buzz domains containing the domain and brand name of legitimate websites with alphanumeric characters added. Some phishing sites were created using hosting services in Japan.

The parties that JPCERT/CC contacted for coordination of phishing sites were 50% domestic and 50% overseas for this quarter, indicating an increase in the proportion of domestic parties compared to the previous quarter (domestic: 38%, overseas: 62%).



### 3.2. Website Defacement Trends

The number of website defacements reported in this quarter was 291. This was a 52% increase from 192 in the previous quarter.

During this quarter, JPCERT/CC observed many cases where victims were redirected to a lottery scam website by means of malicious code embedded in a website. JPCERT/CC confirmed that JavaScript code similar to the example shown below was inserted in many compromised websites.

```
34
    href="https://statcounter.com/" target="_blank"><img</pre>
    class="statcounter"
35
    src="https://c.statcounter.com/12180693/0/22249354/1/"
36
37
    alt="web stats"></a></div></noscript>
     <!-- End of Statcounter Code -->
38
39
40
     kscript>
     setTimeout("location.href='http://www.jjokgo.xyz/jjgo'",300);
41
42
     </script>
43
44
     </head>
45
     <body class="home blog">
46
     <div id="page" class="hfeed site">
47
         <a class="skip-link screen-reader-text" href="#content">Skip to content</a>
48
49
```

[Figure 10: Inserted JavaScript code]

When the compromised website is accessed through a web browser, the visitor is redirected to a fraudulent website, where similar code and HTTP status code (300, etc.) are used to redirect the visitor to yet another website, displaying a lottery scam page like the one shown in [Figure 11] in the end. On the lottery scam page, the visitor is asked to enter personal information, which suggests that the aim is to collect personal information.





[Figure 11: Lottery scam page displayed in the end]

### 3.3. Targeted Attack Trends

There were 6 incidents categorized as a targeted attack. This was a 200% increase from 2 in the previous quarter. The incidents identified are described below.

(1) Attacks using LODEINFO malware

As in the previous quarter, JPCERT/CC continued to receive reports of targeted attacks using LODEINFO malware this quarter. The method observed uses an e-mail with a Word or Excel attachment containing a malicious macro to infect the recipient's computer with LODEINFO malware. These e-mails and attachments contain various content, ranging from information about COVID-19 to a fake resume.

JPCERT/CC posted a blog article discussing LODEINFO in detail during the previous quarter, but the malware identified this quarter used a different format for sending and receiving data (see [Figure 12] and a different execution method (see [Figure 13]). This shows that the malware is being updated frequently and continued vigilance is required.



v0.1.2 00000000: 0c86 a3a9 c739 955b 89a6 00000010: 7400 0000 566c 7e3b 5e60 00000020: 5c1d dceb 9125 e3b1 505 00000030: 55d2 a20d a7b2 7ab8 5Tf 00000040: 50fd e803 6920 0000 002f 00000050: 14e0 3649 19ab dd8f 183e 00000060: 46a1 3077 990b 19d7 1f39	At the offset 0x45, the size of the AES-encrypted data is given as it is. (4 bytes) 0et2 029e /est 02.yb.~_ 263a e9eb 99c7 Pi/&: e985 19e9 38f66I>8. 0000 F.0w9
00000000: f720 4e40 9f33 3c20 1370 000000010: b400 0000 b20d 25ed 3728 00000020: ea2d 40c3 8816 b83a	The data size is XOR-encoded using the 1-byte key at the offset 0x49.
00000030: ac28 defe 761c 7c <sup>2</sup> 79ec 00000040: 5755 ea5c 38 <mark>db 8b8b 8b8b 00000050: ba98 b91f 072c a124 6062 00000060: 2177 0f40 4495 06af d64d 000000070: e420 dd37 c82d 03eb d00a 00000080: 6c23 b72a ba19 b6dc fd94 00000090: e4c7 f0a5 4e0<u>6</u> 8d2c be44</mark>	a9ba c04e ce11 .(v. 6yN cb24 c354 4678 WU.\8\$.TFx df12 7b1 4800 * XOR+-(1byte) 16 30 6qy. e5c7 17d3 8155 l#.*U N,D

[Figure 12: Changes in data transmission/reception format]



[Figure 13: Changes in execution method]

### 3.4. Other Incident Trends

The number of malware sites reported in this quarter was 133. This was a 47% decrease from 250 in the previous quarter.

The number of scans reported in this quarter was 982. This was a 38% increase from 713 in the previous quarter. The ports that the scans targeted are listed in [Chart 4]. Ports targeted frequently were SSH (22/TCP), HTTP (80/TCP) and SMTP (25/TCP).



Port	Jan	Feb	Mar	Total
22/tcp	211	106	170	487
80/tcp	53	61	84	198
25/tcp	40	28	43	111
23/tcp	15	12	13	40
445/tcp	0	29	2	31
443/tcp	6	8	11	25
37215/tcp	7	12	2	21
62223/tcp	14	0	4	18
26/tcp	8	8	2	18
3389/tcp	3	3	6	12
8080/tcp	3	5	2	10
60001/tcp	1	3	5	9
5555/tcp	5	3	1	9
2323/tcp	2	5	2	9
9530/tcp	3	3	2	8
81/tcp	1	6	1	8
1433/tcp	3	3	1	7
21/tcp	1	4	0	5
88/tcp	0	2	2	4
Unknown	15	18	13	46
Monthly Total	391	319	366	1076

[Chart 4 : Number of scans by port]

There were 379 incidents categorized as other. This was a 23% decrease from 492 in the previous quarter.

## 4. Incident Handling Case Examples

This section will describe some actual cases that JPCERT/CC handled in this quarter.

(1) Coordination involving a report of DDoS attacks using open resolvers in Japan

In early April 2020, JPCERT/CC was informed by an overseas security organization that DNS amplification attacks are being carried out from a number of IP addresses in Japan. DNS servers were operating at all the IP addresses reported and acting as open resolvers. JPCERT/CC contacted operators managing the 56 reported IP addresses and requested them to check their DNS server settings.



## **Request from JPCERT/CC**

JPCERT/CC is working to prevent the spread of losses and damages due to incidents and their recurrence through various activities. These include understanding the status and tendency of incidents, and coordination with the aim of suspending or blocking, as the situation requires, attack sources and destination of information transmission, etc. JPCERT/CC also issues alerts and other information to users to make them aware of the need to implement countermeasures.

JPCERT/CC asks for your continued cooperation with information sharing. Please refer to the following web pages for how to report incidents.

Reporting an Incident https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/ir/form.html

Reporting an ICS Incident <u>https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/cs/how\_to\_report\_an\_ics\_incident.html</u>

If you would like to encrypt your report, please use JPCERT/CC's PGP public key. The public key can be obtained at the following web page.

PGP Public Key https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/ir/pgp.html

JPCERT/CC provides a mailing list to ensure speedy delivery of the information it issues. If you wish to use the mailing list, please refer to the following information.

## Appendix-1 Classification of Incidents

JPCERT/CC classifies incidents contained in reports it receives according to the following definitions.

#### O Phishing Site

A "phishing site" refers to a site that spoofs the legitimate site of a bank, auction or other service operators to carry out "phishing fraud" intended to steal user information including IDs, passwords and credit card numbers.

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as "phishing sites".

- Websites made to resemble the site of a financial institution, credit card company, etc.
- Websites set up to guide visitors to a phishing site

○ Website Defacement

"Website defacement" refers to a site whose content has been rewritten by an attacker or malware (including the embedding of a script unintended by the administrator).

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as "website defacement".

- Sites embedded with a malicious script, iframe, etc., by an attacker, malware, etc.
- Sites whose information has been altered by an SQL injection attack

## O Malware Site

A "malware site" refers to a site that infects the computer used to access the site with malware, or a site on which malware used for attack is made publicly available.

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as "malware sites".

- Sites that attempt to infect the visitor's computer with malware
- Sites on which an attacker makes malware publicly available

### O Scan

A "scan" refers to an access made by an attacker (that does not affect the system) to check for the existence of computers, servers and other systems targeted for attack, or to search for vulnerabilities (security holes, etc.) that can be exploited to make unauthorized intrusion into systems. It also includes attempts to infect by malware, etc.

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as "scans".

- Vulnerability searches (checking the program version, service operation status, etc.)
- Attempts to make an intrusion (those that failed)
- Attempts to infect by malware (viruses, bots, worms, etc.) (those that failed)
- Brute force attacks targeting ssh, ftp, telnet, etc. (those that failed)

## ○ DoS/DDoS

"DoS/DDoS" refers to an attack against servers and/or computers on a network, and network resources including devices and connection lines that make up a network, with an attempt to make a service unavailable.

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as "DoS/DDoS".

- Attacks that exhaust network resources with a large volume of traffic, etc.
- Reduction or suspension of server program responses due to a large access volume
- Service interference by sending a large volume of e-mail (error e-mail, SPAM e-mail, etc.)

## ○ ICS Related Incident

An "ICS related incident" refers to an incident related to ICS or plants.

JPCERT/CC classifies the following as an "ICS related incident".

- ICSs that are subject to attack via the Internet
- Servers that malware targeting ICSs communicates with
- Attacks that cause abnormal operations of an ICS

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## ○ Targeted attack

A "targeted attack" is a type of attack in which specific organizations, companies, or industries are targeted for malware infection or unauthorized access.

JPCERT/CC categorizes the following as a targeted attack.

- Spoofed e-mail with malware attached sent to a specific organization
- Defacement of a website affected to limited organizations
- A fake website accessible to limited organizations and attempting to infect site visitor's computer
- A command and control server that specially crafted malware communicates with

### O Other

"Other" refers to incidents other than the above.

The following are examples of incidents that JPCERT/CC classifies as "other".

- Unauthorized intrusion into a system exploiting a vulnerability, etc.
- Unauthorized intrusion by a successful brute force attack targeting ssh, ftp, telnet, etc.
- Stealing of information by malware with a keylogger function
- Infection by malware (viruses, bots, worms, etc.)

These activities are sponsored by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry as part of the "Coordination Activities for International Cooperation in Responding to Cyber Attacks for the 2020 Fiscal Year".

If you would like to quote or reprint this document, please contact the Public Relations of JPCERT/CC (<u>pr@jpcert.or.jp</u>). For the latest information, please refer to JPCERT/CC's website.

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